Introduction
We often make distinctions among causal relations. Sometimes we select one factor as 'the' cause of an effect while relegating others to the causal background. Some causal relations seem more fundamental and less accidental to us than others. And some causes generate a remarkable variety of specific effects, whereas others seem less specific. Several studies have argued that these distinctions are not simply ad hoc and pragmatic but trace ontological characteristics of the causal processes in question (Mitchell 2000 , Woodward 2003 , Weber 2006 , Waters 2007 .
Some studies take genetic causation as a test case, for good reason (Weber 2006 , Waters 2007 , Bogen & Machamer 2010 , Woodward 2010 . Genes and DNA are often portrayed, in both scientific and popular contexts, as exceptionally important causes which 'control' and 'determine' various molecular and developmental processes. Such portrayals have been rejected vociferously by developmental systems theorists, who argue that DNA is just one causal factor among many (e.g., Oyama 1985 , Griffiths & Gray 1994 , Moss 2003 , Stotz 2006 ). Genetic causation is thus a promising area in which to elucidate characterisations like 'control', 'determining', and 'being just one cause among many', and to ask whether these pick out ontological differences among causal relations. What adds to the appeal of genetic causation as a test case is the fact that this domain of biology is rife with informational metaphors. The legitimacy or otherwise of these metaphors has generated a separate debate in philosophy of biology over the years (e.g., Sarkar 1996 , Godfrey-Smith 2000 , Maynard Smith 2000 , Griffiths 2001 , Stegmann 2005 , Shea 2007 , Bogen & Machamer 2010 , Levy 2010 . The relevance of this debate in the present context lies in the prospect of employing new causal concepts (such as 'actual difference makers' (Waters 2007) and 'causal specificity' (Woodward 2010) in order to reconstruct informational metaphors in purely causal terms (Weber 2006 (Weber , Šustar 2007 .
So far, analyses of causal relations have had little to say about the sense in which we take certain causes to 'control' processes.
1 Yet the idea of causes that control is ubiquitous in science and everyday life. In this paper I distinguish between two causal structures at the level of ensembles of cause-effect pairs. I argue that one of the structures captures one distinct sense in which causes can plausibly be construed as 'controlling' their effects. I then apply this account of causal control to genetic causation, arguing that claims about the controlling and informational role of DNA can be shown to have precise, empirical content.
Causation and causal specificity
The causal structure to be identified in this paper is best characterised in terms of Woodward's (2003) manipulability account of causation. It also involves causal specificity in Woodward's sense (2010) . I therefore start by sketching, very briefly, the two central concepts, causation and causal specificity. For ease of exposition, I follow Woodward's recent summary of his notion of causation:
"(M) X causes Y if and only if there are background circumstances B such that if some (single) intervention that changes the value of X (and no other variable) were to occur in B, then Y or the probability distribution of Y would change." (Woodward 2010, p. 290) There are several features of Woodward's account that need to be mentioned but will not be defended here (for Woodward's defence see his 2003). For instance, Woodward's theory is nonreductive insofar as it allows causal notions to enter his analysis of causation. Furthermore, Woodward takes the relata of causation to be variables, rather than events. This allows, among other things, to construe variations in causes as changes in the values of variables. One of the features that is worth highlighting for present purposes is that X's causing Y does not imply that X is the only cause of Y in the sense that Y's value depends exclusively on X's value. For if one or more of the background circumstances were to change (variables other than X taking different values), Y's value may cease to depend on X's value. X's causing Y implies, instead, that under certain background conditions intervening to change X's value would be sufficient to change Y's value. For instance, the match's being lit causes fire because there are background circumstances (e.g. the presence of oxygen) in which intervening to change X's value (from unlit to lit) changes whether or not a fire occurs. The intervention on X in this case is the striking of the match. On Woodward's account, not any change in X that would change Y qualifies as an
intervention. An intervention in the technical sense is a manipulation that changes Y as a result of only changing X, and in no other way. This is why striking match M is an intervention on X with respect to Y, but pouring petrol over the whole match box (containing M) and igniting it is not. Both are manipulations that set M alight (X) and change whether fire is present (Y). But the ignited petrol changes whether fire is present not only as a consequence of lighting M.
The fact that the lit match causes fire is compatible with there being circumstances in which it does not change the presence of fire, e.g. when there is insufficient oxygen. Roughly, the larger the set of background circumstances in which the X-Y relation obtains, the larger its degree of invariance or stability. Some causal relations are more invariant than others. So the degree of invariance of a given causal relation is one dimension along which it may differ from other causal relations (Woodward 2003 (Woodward , 2010 .
Another dimension along which causal relations can diverge is their specificity. One sense of specificity is the degree to which the set of counterfactual dependencies between causes and effects is 'fine-grained'. With reference to Lewis' notion of causal influence, Woodward characterises this kind of specificity as follows: 
External and internal causal ordering
With these notions in place, let us now consider an ordered set of effects, for example the triple <F, G, H>. There are two ways in which the triple may arise. One possibility is that one effect becomes the cause of the next, i.e. F causes G and G causes H (we may assume that F is caused by another variable P). For example, pressing the push-button of an electric bell (F)
closes an electric circuit (G) so that a current flows through the conductor (H). This sequence of events can be described as an ordered set of variables taking on certain values depending on the value of the previous variable. The effects G and H are caused by variables that are part of this set, i.e. they are caused by F and G, respectively. We can call this causal structure internal ordering or I-ordering, for short ( fig. 1 a) .
Another mode in which a triple of effects may arise is through cause variables that are not part of the set. In addition to effect variables F, G, and H as well as the external cause P, there are causes Q and R, such that P causes F, Q causes G, and R causes H. For example, barometer readings on three consecutive days (F, G, and H) depend on atmospheric pressure at the time (P, Q, and R) rather than the previous reading. Here the effects G and H are caused by variables that are not part of the triple (i.e. they are caused by Q and R, respectively). Let us call this causal structure external ordering or E-ordering ( fig. 1 b) .
In external ordering, the variables composing the product, here <F, G, H>, are only effect variables with respect to one another, and the cause variables are not part of the product. No effect variable in an E-ordered process becomes the cause with respect to the variable next in the ordered set, unlike in I-ordering. There is consequently a strict separation between an entity that acts as a series of causes and an entity that is caused by it. E-ordered processes, here <F, G, H> taking certain values, are therefore processes in which every 'step' of the process is an effect of an external cause. It is natural to think of such external entities as 'controlling' the process they cause because every step in such a process depends on the external entity. This sense of control is manifest in various technological artefacts.
Consider the devices categorised as "sequence controlled machines" (Brennecke 2000, p. 57): music boxes, automatic looms, and other machines (Ceruzzi 1983 , Randell 1994 whether a peg is present or absent (its 'value'), this would change whether or not a tone is played and, if it is played, which tone is played. 4 Crucially, which tone is played at a particular point in time depends on which peg strikes the comb at that time, not on the tone played before. Since a peg is not part of the melody in the sense in which a tone is part of the melody, the series of tones is caused by external factors. In other words, the pegs externally order tone sequences.
Another example are Jacquard looms. These looms used series of punchcards to raise and lower so-called Bolus hooks, which in turned raised and lowered a harness. Whether a given Bolus hook is raised or lowered at a particular point in time does not depend on which Bolus hooks were raised before. It rather depends on whether or not there is a hole at a certain position in the punchcard. And the hole in the punchcard is not part of the triple of Bolus hook states <F, G, H>.
The sequence control exemplified by these machines is not simply the property of stepping through a sequence of states in a regular, repeatable manner. It is the more specific property of the machine's operations being externally ordered.
Interestingly, music boxes and looms are regarded as precursors of modern day computers exactly because they are sequence controlled (Ceruzzi 1983 , Randell 1994 , Brennecke 2000 . So it is not surprising to find the same kind of sequence control in some early computers. In the IBM ASCC (Harvard Mark I), for example, operations performed at a given point in time did not depend on the previous operation but rather on the pattern of holes in the linearly moving paper tape (called "control tape", Harvard Computational Laboratory 1946, p. 11) . Early computers like the ASCC, whose operations were specified by continually feeding a punched tape through the machine and which lacked branching orders, have been labelled "tape-controlled" computers (Randell 1973, p. 352) . 5 Again, E-ordering captures the sense in which these tapes 'control' machine operations.
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Before applying this notion of control to the biological case, a few comments about the E-/I-distinction itself are in order. First, E-and I-ordering are the extreme ends of a spectrum.
Within an otherwise E-ordered set there may be some effect variables which depend on variables in other positions. In addition, a given effect variable may itself cause other effects that do not belong to the ordered set (e.g. raised Bolus hook raise the harness). And some of these effects may in turn influence an effect variable within the set, breaking simple E-ordering (e.g.
conditional branching orders in stored-programme computers, see footnote 12). On the other hand, within an otherwise I-ordered set some of the variables may not depend on variables in other positions.
Second, whether or not a given variable belongs to an ordered set is critical to E-and Iordering. So far I have simply stipulated that, say, variable G is part of the effect triple <F, G, H>, whereas R is not. Groups of variables in real-world systems may be causally and functionally integrated to a degree that they constitute the parts of an individual. What it takes for something to be part of an individual is a complex metaphysical issue. But, assuming that a collection of entities can reasonably be construed as forming the parts of an individual, it is a separate question whether the parts are E-or I-ordered. It is the latter issue that is at stake here.
The question of external or internal ordering becomes an interesting empirical issue only on the assumption that the existence of a multi-component individual can be established on independent grounds.
The last comment concerns the relation between the E-/I-distinction and Woodward's causal specificity. The degree of fine-grained counterfactual dependence (INF) and E-/I-ordering are distinct features of causal relations. Suppose that variables F, G, H, P, Q, and R can take two values each (f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 , and so on) and that all cause-effect pairs exhibit maximal causal specificity (INF). That is, each value of a cause variable C maps to exactly one value of an effect variable E and vice versa (the relation is 1-1 and onto, or bijective): c 1 maps to e 1 and c 2 maps to e 2 . Under these conditions, intervening to change C's value from c 1 to c 2 would change E's value from e 1 to e 2 . This would hold for all cause-effect pairs irrespective of whether they are part of an I-or an E-ordered process. If the triple of effects <F, G, H> were I-ordered, then F's taking on a given value would affect all values of the other members of the triple. If F took on value f 1 , then G would take value g 1 and H would take value h 1 . On the other hand, if F took value f 2 , then G would take value g 2 and H would take value h 2 . By contrast, if the triple <F, G, H> were E-ordered, then F's taking on f 1 would have no consequences on the values of G and H. This would be the case despite all cause-effect pairs in both triples sharing the same degree of causal specificity.
In this section I have argued that we should understand a familiar and ubiquitous sense of 'control' in terms of a certain causal structure. The rest of the paper applies this exposition of control to a particular class of biological processes. This will shed light on two contested issues in philosophy of biology: the causal role of DNA and its status as information carrier. I start with the causal role of DNA.
DNA: from causal specificity to external ordering
Recent work on the causal role of DNA has paid careful attention to kinds of causal relations (Weber 2006 , Waters 2007 , Woodward 2010 . In order to see what is involved in claims about the 'special' causal role of DNA, it is useful to begin by considering its role in a particular molecular process, DNA replication.
The textbook account of DNA replication goes something like this. A new strand of DNA (daughter strand) is synthesised by successively adding new components (nucleotides) to a linear chain. Several causal factors are involved, chief among them a pre-existing DNA strand (parent strand) and the DNA polymerase, an enzyme. Yet, of all causes involved, only the parent strand determines or specifies the base sequence of the daughter strand. It acts as the template, i.e. as the entity that determines which of the four possible nucleotides is being added to the daughter strand. By contrast, the polymerase merely assists in adding the new components by catalysing the chemical reaction that binds them to the growing strand.
On closer inspection it is unclear what 'determining' or 'specifying' consist in. It cannot mean counterfactual dependence simpliciter, because the daughter strand depends on both the template and polymerase. Adding an adenine to the growing daughter strand counterfactually depends on there being a thymine in the parent strand (if there had not been a thymine, a base other than adenine would have been added). But crucially, it also depends counterfactually on the presence of DNA polymerase, because adenine would not have been incorporated without it.
Adding adenine depends, furthermore, on a host of other factors and conditions, such as the facts underlying Watson-Crick base-pairing (complementarity, a set of four bases, and so on ).
Suppose the thymine-adenine rule was to change to thymine-thymine (assuming this would be chemically possible), then the thymine in the template would yield another thymine, not an adenine. Hence, the fact that adenine is being added also depends counterfactually on the base pairing rule being thymine-adenine. In short, the addition of adenine depends not only on the DNA template. But once all this is granted, what justification remains for viewing the template as 'determining' the daughter strand? Woodward's (2010) answer to the puzzle is to analyse 'determining' and 'specifying' in terms of causal specificity (INF). A variable C 1 is a specific cause of an effect to the extent that the effect depends in a fine-grained way on C 1 . And C 1 is a more specific cause than C 2 just in case the degree to which C 1 causes the effect in a fine-grained way is greater than that of C 2 .
This, Woodward continues, holds in the case of processes like transcription (RNA synthesis). In transcription, many variations in the DNA template will cause corresponding variations in the RNA sequence, whereas we cannot intervene on the RNA polymerase, of which there is just one kind in prokaryotes, and cause the same degree of variation in RNA sequences. One may vary the concentration of polymerase, but this will only result in modifying the rate of synthesis, not in altering the sequences produced. In transcription, therefore, templates are the factor that is more causally specific than polymerase (a non-genetic factor). For present purposes it is worth pointing out that the difference in causal specificity between templates and polymerases also obtains at the level of individual bases within sequences. Let C and Γ be the two cause variables parent base and polymerase, respectively, and E the effect variable daughter base. C and E can take on five values, the bases adenine (subscript a), thymine (t), guanine (g), and cytosine (c) as well as s for absent (no base with respect to their effect, the newly added nucleotide.
However, templates and polymerases differ not only in their degree of causal specificity. 8 As I will argue in the following paragraphs, they also differ insofar as templates externally order daughter sequences, whereas polymerases do not.
We saw that in the circumstances in which DNA replication occurs in organisms there is only one kind of causal factor on which daughter bases depend in a fine-grained way, and that factor is another base, not the polymerase. 9 Furthermore, that base belongs to the parent strand.
By contrast, the previously added base does not influence in any way the identity of the base added next. These facts make DNA replication an E-ordered process. In more detail, consider a three-unit sub-section of a newly synthesised DNA sequence, F-G-H, where F, G, and H denote the linearly arranged bases of the daughter strand. There are three bases (P, Q, and R) which are not part of the daughter strand, such that P causes F, Q causes G, R causes H (E-ordering For questions of symmetry the crucial point is that the E-ordering entity in DNA replication is the DNA template. The polymerase is also an external cause of synthesis insofar as it is not part of the new daughter strand. But it is not the E-ordering entity, nor a part of it. So, the template differs from the polymerase (and other causally relevant factors) in the degree of causal specificity (INF), but it also differs with respect to E-ordering.
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This finding generalises to other instances of template-directed syntheses: the E-ordering entities in these processes are the (DNA or RNA) templates, not the other causally relevant factors. Consider protein synthesis, which is an E-ordered process because the addition of any given amino acid to the nascent polypeptide does not depend on the nature of any previously added amino acid. Protein synthesis proceeds in circumstances in which the mapping between mRNA codons and amino acids (the 'genetic code') persists. In these circumstances, the kind of amino acid integrated at a particular position depends in a fine-grained way only on the type of codon in the corresponding position in the mRNA. The amino acid sequence is therefore Eordered by the mRNA base sequence.
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It is time to address a worry. It may seem as if the E-/I-distinction is contingent on how a process is described. Take DNA replication again. Successive rounds of replication yield a series of single DNA strands, in which every single strand templates the next. 13 The nature of the new strand depends on the old, i.e. on the previous (terminal) element of this time sequence of DNA strands. So described, DNA replication may seem to be an I-ordered process. And it is. But in so describing replication, we simply consider a different product (effect variable). The 'polymer'
we are now considering is a time series of single strands, not a spatial series of individual bases, and there is no inconsistency in the former being I-ordered but the latter E-ordered. The observation only shows that one must be clear about which effect variable is being considered.
DNA is a 'special' causal factor both in terms of its degree of causal specificity and in its ability to externally order causal processes. Perhaps DNA is also special in the sense that hardly any causes other than nucleic acid templates E-order molecular processes. This is an open empirical issue which cannot be fully settled here. But it is worth noting that even exemplars of non-genetic factors that may be said to 'control' development do not E-order the respective developmental processes. Take temperature-dependent sex determination. In some reptiles, temperature modulates the expression of a gene regulatory network implicated in gonad differentiation. One possible modulation mechanism is that colder temperatures trigger the expression of the tumor-repressor gene Wt1, which in turn affects the downstream gene regulatory network (Valenzuela 2008) . If something like this is correct, then temperature does not E-order the series of steps in developing an organism's sexual organs. Instead, the process involves partial dependence on previous steps: if the temperature had not been below a certain threshold, Wt1 would not have been expressed; and without the expression of Wt1 the regulatory network would not have been affected in the way it was, and so on. Examples like this suggest that, as a minimum, E-ordering is not spread evenly among genetic and non-genetic factors of development. Whatever the empirical findings, the notion of E-ordering provides a clear means of assessing and comparing claims about developmental control.
In short, nucleic acids are a special causal factor because of their role as E-ordering entities.
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The next section explores the implications of this fact for the nature and legitimacy of a range of metaphors taken from information technology.
Varieties of causal relations: specificity, control, and information
Earlier it was noted that the DNA daughter strand depends not only on the template, but also on the polymerase because replication would not proceed without it. This generates the apparent symmetry in causal status between templates and polymerase. At this point molecular biologists would have been quick to emphasise that DNA polymerase is insensitive to the chemical nature of the nucleotides it conjoins; it does not influence which base is added. In other words, there is an asymmetry insofar as the contrast of adding (say) adenine, rather than a different base, depends exclusively on the parent base (whereas the addition of one base or another depends on both). This, I suggest, is the difference captured by causal specificity (INF): when applied at the level of individual bases in a template, causal specificity accounts for the sense in which bases are said to 'determine' or 'specify' exactly which new bases are added.
However, when templates are said to 'control', 'specify', or 'direct' product sequences, more is at work than a claim about the causal specificity of their components (INF). Genes and DNA have often and controversially been regarded as loci of control, a notion that has proven hard to explicate (cf. Weber 2005) . To the extent that DNA (and RNA) templates E-order the synthesis of macromolecules, it is natural to regard them as 'controlling' each step in that process, in just the sense in which we take music boxes and looms to be sequence controlled.
Template-directed synthesis is as externally ordered a process as operating a music box or a loom.
The similarity in causal structure can be pursued further. Externally ordered processes have E-ordering entities. In template-directed syntheses the E-ordering entities are templates, in music boxes, looms and punch-card machines they are pegged cylinders, perforated tape or stacks of punched cards. Whatever the many differences between these entities, they all share a causal role. It is then not surprising to find DNA templates being compared to punched cards and tapes 16 , and template-directed synthesis being conceptualised as a "tape-reading" processes 17 .
Such metaphors have been popular since the 1950s, especially in the context of research into the basic mechanism of protein synthesis. They can be understood as highlighting a causal structure that neither professional nor lay audiences had encountered in the biological realm before the 1960s, but one with which they were familiar at the time from early computers and punch-card machines in research laboratories and business offices. The kind of operation performed at any one point normally depended on the bit string presently in the instruction register, not on the previous operation or its computational result (Ceruzzi 1983) . 18 This suggests that in the IAS and similar early stored-programme computers the machine-level instructions (bit strings) E-ordered the sequence of operations to a significant extent. 19 Note also that for several decades the programme of stored-programme computers was loaded into memory by encoding it on tape and then feeding it to the computer (Ceruzzi 1983 , Williams 1997 . Thus, DNA templates share the causal role of E-ordering with some of the early machine-level instructions and their storage media. Conceptualising DNA as a carrier of information and instruction can therefore be understood as a means of emphasising that shared role.
This understanding of informational metaphors in molecular biology allows their reconstruction in causal terms. 20 Suppose a bacterial polypeptide is said to have amino acid sequence S because of the information contained in sequence T of its mRNA template. On the present account, this explanation would amount to the following claims: S was produced by Eordering, T was the E-ordering entity with respect to S, and the polypeptide has S because the template had T. The content of the informational explanation for the polypeptide's sequence being S is, in short, that it has S because it was E-ordered by an mRNA with T. In this explanation information is supposed to explain an individual product sequence. This idea poses no difficulty if 'T carries information for the production of S' is analysed as 'T externally orders the production of S'. The wider point here is that informational descriptions and explanations can play a specific and useful theoretical role. And this positive role stems from highlighting certain causal features, not from attributing semantic information or content.
The notion of E-ordering can also be employed to reconstruct Crick's (1958) 'central dogma'. The central dogma can be recast as a set of claims about the sort of molecules acting as E-ordering entities in the synthesis of nucleic acid strands and polypeptides: nucleic acids Eorder the synthesis of other nucleic acids and of amino acid sequences, but amino acid sequences do not. 21 Once the informational claims are rendered as causal claims about E-ordering, their truth or falsity becomes an empirical matter. Furthermore, since E-ordering comes in degrees, templates may also be said to carry information to some extent. As Sarkar (1996) , Stotz (2006) and others emphasised, nucleic acid templates often have very little impact on product sequences. For example, DNA templates have little influence on amino acid sequences in eukaryotes due to RNA splicing and other mechanism. It therefore seems false to say that DNA carries information about those sequences. But to the extent that nucleic acids play an E-ordering role, informational metaphors are apt and their use justifiable 22 .
Two further features of the proposal are worth pointing out. First, the causal reconstruction in terms of E-ordering not only shows that a specific causal role happens to coincide with informational language; it also explains why that role in particular motivates informational descriptions. E-ordering motivates informational descriptions because the entities that tended to E-order the operations of early computers (certain machine-level instructions) were and are considered to be information carriers. Comparing a molecular process with the new information technology was an effective way of gesturing towards a causal structure for which there was no biological precedent at the time. It is this similarity in causal roles that can justify the use of information concepts. 23 Second, there are interesting differences between kinds of templatedirected syntheses. In translation, for example, template and product elements belong to different biochemical classes and, arguably, are related arbitrarily to one another. In replication and transcription, by contrast, template and product elements belong to the same biochemical class (nucleic acids) and are not arbitrarily related. But according to the central dogma, these differences are irrelevant to the question of whether they carry information; they all do. This is what one would expect if information transfer is tied to E-ordering, as I have argued. 
Conclusion
The idea of causes that 'control' processes is familiar, not least from machines in which every step appears to depend on entities that are not part of the outcome. The 'sequence controlled' operations of music boxes, automatic looms and punchcard machines are examples. I have argued that 'control' in this sense can be identified with a certain causal structure, external ordering. Since series of effects may vary in the degree to which they are externally ordered, this causal structure is one dimension along which causal relations can differ. It is a dimension distinct from variations in other causal features, such as causal specificity or invariance.
External ordering is particularly useful in analysing genetic causation. another, as is the thickness and length of the comb's teeth, and so on. Changing the thickness of teeth would also change which tone is played. Nonetheless, changing the pegs would change tones across a range of values of other cause variables. 5 Other early computers, like the ENIAC, operated differently. In these computers, the programme the machine executed was defined by the configurations of patch cables and switch settings (e.g. Ceruzzi 1983 , Copeland 2006 . 6 The E-ordering entities in early stored-programme computers and the ASCC were machinelevel instructions (Harvard Computational Laboratory 1946) . But series of data can also E-order operations. For example, the IBM Accounting Machine 407 was fed one card at a time from a stack of cards whose hole pattern encoded commercially relevant data. The same kind of operation was performed on all cards in a stack, e.g. adding numbers. But the precise action performed by the machine depended on the holes in the card currently being read, not on the nature of the previous operations (IBM 1953) . The stack of punch-cards or, more precisely, the hole patterns in the cards, therefore acted as the E-ordering entity with respect to the temporal sequence of operations. By re-wiring a plugboard, the IBM 407 could perform a different kind of task on a given stack of cards, e.g. printing data. This made it unnecessary to carry the stack of cards to another special-purpose machine (e.g. collators, tabulators, reproducers), as had been the case with previous punched card machines (Ceruzzi 2003 can shed light on the sense in which molecular biologists causally privilege DNA in the context of template-directed synthesis. I will pursue this concern in detail elsewhere.
of the specificities of various types of bonds between aminoacyl-tRNA-synthetase, on the one hand, and tRNAs and amino acids, on the other hand. Changing some of these specificities may change which amino acid is incorporated in response to a given codon. Molecules like tRNA and their specificities are therefore also cause variables with respect to the addition of amino acids, and at least some changes in some of these variables will have a fine-grained effect on the effect variable. However, they are not the E-ordering factors in the circumstances in which protein synthesis occurs in organisms, because these are circumstances in which the genetic code (and the underlying specificities) persist during synthesis. In addition, it is hard to see how the ordered set of (say) tRNAs involved in protein synthesis could constitute an individual in the way in which the ordered set of codons constitutes an individual (i.e., an mRNA). Maintaining that in actual organisms the E-ordering factors are templates is compatible with there being possible worlds in which other molecules satisfy this role, or none do. Neumann-Held (2006) provides an interesting thought experiment that can be interpreted along these lines. 13 Of course, replication does not yield 'single strands' in the sense that daughter strands remain isolated from their parent strands. 14 For instance, DNA is unlikely to control gene regulation and downstream developmental processes in the sense of E-ordering. Successive rounds of switching on and off genes seem closer to I-ordering (although morphogen gradients may be interesting exceptions). Again, these are open empirical issues that require further investigation. 15 I take E-ordering to be an explication of what I referred to earlier as "advance specification" (Stegmann, 2005) . 16 DNA has been compared to a series of "punch-cards" (Lederberg 1955 , quoted in Kay 2000 114), a "punched tape" (Bonner 1965 ), a "magnetic tape" (Jacob 1974) , and so on. 17 Woese (1967, p. 5) offers an extensive description of template-directed syntheses in terms of "tape-reading", in which "output tapes" (new nucleic acid and amino acid sequences) are generated by feeding "input tapes" (DNA and RNA templates) linearly through "tape readers". 18 Writing about the IAS computer, Ceruzzi (1983, p. 140) observes: "The address of the next instruction was likewise not given; it was assumed to be in the memory location right next to the instruction just executed. Thus although the IAS machine was a stored-program computer, it normally executed instructions in a steady linear stream coming from the memory, just as if they were coming off a tape".
established by the EDVAC and the IAS (Randell 1973 , Ceruzzi 1983 , Aspray 1990 . It is also clear, however, that modern computers are not normally E-ordered due to conditional branching and other features in which the decision about which instruction to execute next depends on the outcome of the previous step. Indeed, much of the power and versatility of SPCs stems from such features (Aspray 1990) , which break strict E-ordering. The computation of functions arguably requires this dependence on previous operations and their outcomes (Piccinini 2008) .
Note, however, that the E-/I-distinction remains valuable for characterising causal structures that are intermediates between E-and I-ordered processes, including transfer orders, conditional branching, and so on. 20 Obviously not all uses of informational metaphors in molecular or developmental biology should be construed in terms of E-ordering. But I suggest that E-ordering makes sense of how some of these metaphors were used in research on the mechanism of protein synthesis and, more generally, in the context of template-directed synthesis (e.g. in Crick's 'central dogma'). 21 Weber (2006) (Stegmann 2004 , Darden 2006 ). 25 External ordering may also be useful in elucidating the notion of programmability as well as the relation between algorithms and the kinds of artifacts often used to illustrate them (e.g. cooking recipes). 26 This paper has had a long gestation period. Early versions were presented in Birmingham,
